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Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis: Issues and 
Action 
 
Demetra ARSALIDOU1 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Almost a decade has passed since the global financial crisis emerged; a crisis that has made 
companies, regulators and society more conscious of the possible failings in regulation, board 
function and shareholder behaviour. This paper discusses three interrelated corporate 
governance weaknesses linked to a financial crisis, and considers ways to reduce their impact 
in future. The first part discusses the role of regulatory and supervisory deficiencies as a 
primary cause of the crisis. It provides a concise overview of the flaws of the UK regulatory 
authority, and examines the reasons it fell short of the high professional standards in the 
execution of its supervisory obligations. Ways to improve the regulatory and supervisory 
authorities are also considered. In the next part, the paper examines the role played by the two 
primary internal organs of the company: the directors and the shareholders. It considers issues 
of directors’ training, accountability and shareholder engagement and deliberates upon the 
improvements that can be introduced to enhance the role of directors and shareholders within 
the corporate governance arena.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
In the economic crisis of 2008 three issues stand out. To start with, there were deficiencies in 
the system of bank supervision by the regulatory authorities. Also, there was poor corporate 
governance within large institutions; boards of directors appeared to tolerate perverse 
incentives and seemed unable to comprehend and manage risk. Finally, shareholders appeared 
unwilling to exercise any governance rights; the majority behaved like “absentee landlords” 
failing to act when their institutions were heading for breakdown. All in all, the external and 
internal instruments used to pursue financial stability have greatly disappointed: this, sadly, is 
the one clear conclusion that can be reached approximately a decade since the emergence of 
the economic catastrophe of 2008. 
 
Let us start with the first issue: supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities hold a 
central role in ensuring sound corporate governance and in enhancing confidence in the 
financial markets. Yet, restoring confidence in the market is a complicated affair; certainly, 
improving the supervisory and regulatory regime in itself without considering the two internal 
participants in corporate governance, is an inadequate response. Therefore, when reflecting 
more deeply upon the nature of the financial crisis two matters call for adjustment: change to 
the external supervision and regulation of large institutions and change to the internal 
corporate culture of the financial system. Conceptually, the correct approach lies in a strong 
regulatory regime able to scrutinize the strategies of financial institutions with scepticism, and 
capable of intervening effectively if and when the need arises. Still, in thinking of the 2008 
crisis, although not the first of its kind regulators and supervisors appeared to have learnt few 
lessons from previous experiences. The Financial Services Authority, the former regulatory 
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authority in the UK, has been heavily criticised for failing to meet the required standards of 
watchfulness and direction in the execution of its supervisory duties. 2  Its procedures in 
supervising large financial institutions were generally insufficient and it systematically failed 
in its duties as regulator of the financial industry. Therefore, the first part of the paper 
provides a concise overview of the failings and flaws of the regulatory authority. It examines 
the reasons it fell short of the high professional standards in the execution of its supervisory 
approach. It also considers ways to improve the supervisory authority, particularly ways of 
reinforcing its integrity and resources. Then, this part examines the powers granted to the 
Financial Conduct Authority under the Financial Services Market Act 2000, which have not 
so far, been deployed properly. The proper use of the FMSA rules will benefit not only a 
firm’s shareholders but also the broader economy; therefore a number of suggestions are put 
forward. The regulatory authority should periodically carry out a review of the current 
qualifications of senior directors in financial institutions, and should ensure that the existing 
approved person regime requirements are adequate.3 It should exercise the power to approve 
the appointment of bank directors routinely and must also see that directors possess the 
required skills, knowledge and training to understand the financial implications of their 
institutions. Under resourcing is another vital issue deliberated here, primarily the inadequate 
supervisory staff resources. 4  Connected to this is the question of the supervisors’ 
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remuneration, as well as the possible adoption of more aggressive rules regarding capital 
requirements.  
  
While it is recognised that there is a need for fundamental change in the regulatory 
supervision, it is equally important to consider the incentives and behaviours of the internal 
controllers on the one hand, and owners of large institutions on the other. The analysis of the 
internal participants in corporate governance is carried out on two levels. First, the paper 
examines the directors’ failure to understand the strategies and products adopted by their 
institutions. This is a particularly worrying matter, especially in considering the supervisory 
role attached to boards of directors. If board members do not have the knowledge or skills to 
challenge other key company participants (such as the chief executive officers) significant 
difficulties arise. The paper proceeds to examine two interconnected issues linked to this 
particular inadequacy. First, it considers the question of directors’ training and qualifications, 
as well as the question of their accountability. It is suggested that there should be a 
requirement for directors to possess a minimum level of training and qualifications akin to 
that required of other professionals. This is followed by the question of their disqualification, 
a strong measure should they fail to display the required degree of understanding and skill. 
The field of disqualification needs to be reviewed and a number of cases should be targeted 
that would involve the possibility of disqualifying directors of institutions that would have 
failed had it not been for the last-minute financial support by the government.  
 
The last part of the paper considers whether shareholders could ever act as effective 
guardians. The idea that shareholders should play an important role in the governance of 
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public institutions is not novel;5 yet still, possibly due to the failure of alternative solutions to 
solve the “agency problem” this notion has received considerable attention in recent years. 
This renewed interest is also due to the introduction of the UK Stewardship Code, which 
requires institutional investors to engage with and challenge management more than before. 
The Code promotes a strong investment ideology; however, the paper suggests that due to a 
plethora of reasons its ambition cannot realistically materialise; by and large, it introduces a 
quasi-regulatory framework whilst making few substantive changes. Although the question of 
investor engagement is not new, the circumstances are new, and possibly not as advantageous 
as previously. Therefore, given the significant issues with shareholder stewardship, one ought 
to be careful before casually increasing the powers of shareholders to interfere. 
 
II. THE ROLE OF THE EXTERNAL SUPERVISORS IN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
 
A. The Discipline of the Market 
 
The problems with the 2008 financial crisis began following the heavy losses by major 
financial institutions as a result of their involvement in asset-backed securitization. In 
reviewing the main reasons for the failure in the US, two under-recognized causes were 
identified. First, the excessive reliance on credit rating agencies which became increasingly 
subject to client pressure as competition increased in this market. Second a shift toward more 
self-regulatory rules which allowed investment banks to increase leverage and reduce 
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diversification under the pressure of competition.6  
 
During the 1990’s the UK Government was committed to the idea of self-regulation and 
minimal government interference. Although in the same decade there was a succession of 
reports initiated by industry (such as Cadbury Report, 1992; Greenbury Committee Report, 
1995; Hampel Committee, 1998) aimed at improving corporate governance practices,7 to a 
large extend these were initiated because of fear that government may interfere and impose 
higher requirements.8 But industry had no reason to worry. The Government was determined 
not to interfere and was committed to maintaining a neo-liberal agenda. Rigorous regulation 
was opposed by market theorists on the grounds that the market already imposes a certain 
discipline which is sufficient to safeguard an acceptable level of competence and efficiency. 
The potential consequences of legal regulation in addition to those already provided by the 
markets were not viewed as desirable or necessary; instead, they were seen as a distortion of 
managerial behaviour.9 All in all, there was a powerful faith in the merits of the market 
economy.  
 
For a generation or more, the public was told, not least by the City, that the disciplines of the 
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market economy were essential for greater prosperity in the longer term, even if harsh and 
painful in the short run.10 Numerous market mechanisms were identified by economists as 
providing institutions such as banks with the incentive to perform well. Firstly, managers need 
to perform well in order to keep their jobs. Although normally the board decides whether an 
internal reorganisation of management is called upon, it is not uncommon for shareholders or 
creditors to apply pressure if it is believed that the apparent failings are the fault of certain 
individual managers. Secondly, the underperforming company could become the target of a 
takeover. In such cases the predator benefits by securing control of the poorly performed 
company at a price that is above the market price the shares held prior to the bid but below the 
price at which they would trade if the target company was properly managed. Thirdly, 
managers are motivated to perform well in order to reduce the costs incurred by the company 
in its attempt to raise capital from the markets. Fourthly, compensation packages, such as 
shares, share options, stock options and cash bonuses linked to company performance, can be 
employed for the purpose of reducing the divergence between the interests of the shareholders 
and managers. Through the policy of compensation, managers have a personal interest in the 
company performing well. This, in turn, can help align the interests of shareholders and 
managers.11  
 
There is a lot to be said in favour of market discipline. Legal rules come with substantial costs 
such as wasteful research and excessive documentation of decision-making that may actually 
prove unnecessary and costly. Those who oppose mandatory legal rules argue that legal 
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constraints merely supplement the parties’ private bargain and the operation of market forces, 
and that parties should be free to decide whether or not to dispense with certain general laws 
deemed unnecessary to their bargain.12 However, as noted by Ferran this assessment and the 
downplaying of the importance of general legal rules assumes that market forces operate 
effectively and with acceptable results. Both assumptions can be questioned. For example, 
studies indicate that there are many criteria that may influence a predator in a takeover 
situation; under-performance is not the sole criteria. Equally, the effectiveness of incentive 
schemes based on a firm’s remuneration policies is impossible to assess. For instance, 
compensation packages were a major contributing factor to the excessive risk-taking by 
financial institutions. Executives were rewarded for risky behaviour, and by protecting them 
from the adverse consequences of that behaviour, pay arrangements for financial-sector 
bosses produced perverse incentives, encouraging them to gamble and take unnecessary risks 
on their firm’s behalf. As noted, one important factor that actually provoked excessive risk-
taking were the standard pay packages that rewarded directors for short-term gains, even 
when those gains are subsequently reversed. Even with more than half of the share-market 
value of the financial sector being wasted during the past five - seven years, “[...] executives 
were still able to cash out, prior to the stock market implosion, large amounts of equity 
compensation and bonus compensation.”13 Through these pay structures, directors were given 
the incentive to pursue short-term gains, and that is even when this meant enhancing the 
possibility of a subsequent implosion.14 Similarly, stock options were identified as potentially 
having a negative effect on firms, particularly in those instances where managers would 
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refrain from raising concerns about strategy because of possible adverse consequences on the 
share price and value of the options.15 
 
B. The Evolution and Failings of the UK Regulatory Regime 
 
The idea that government should not interfere in the operation of the market has all too often 
been pushed to extremes. In fact, in thinking about the latest financial crisis, it could be said 
that it is not the discipline of the market that failed. Rather, the regulatory system has failed to 
react adequately and appropriately to the obvious signs that serious financial problems were 
steadily heading towards the UK and global economies. Had there been proper and effective 
supervision of the major institutions the crisis would not have reached such massive and 
catastrophic dimensions, that saw the UK government rescuing a number of banking 
institutions, such as Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds, Bradford and Bingley and Northern 
Rock.16 This, at a substantial cost to the UK taxpayer. This scenario is not a novel. Despite the 
commitment to the idea of non-interference in the markets, the UK regulatory system has 
traditionally failed to act proactively; this lack of intereference is seen in a series of financial 
failures in the 1990’s, including the Bank of England’s supervision of the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International (BCCI) that collapsed in 1991. In fact, the closure of BCCI provoked 
widespread public concern, with some, especially in the financial community, heavily 
criticizing the UK authorities for not taking action earlier.17 The Binghman inquiry, set up to 
examine the poor supervision of BCCI, criticised the Bank of England for its supervisory 
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failures, particularly for its inability to spot crucial and numerous warning signs early on.18 
Remarkably, the bank’s collapse led to something unprecedented in British legal history: the 
liquidators of the bank instituted a substantial lawsuit of one billion dollars against the Bank 
of England as a regulatory body, thereby breaking new grounds by challenging the Bank’s 
statutory immunity.19 The charge the Bank of England faced was the charge of negligence 
amounting to misfeasance in public office. The liquidators made extensive allegations of 
wrongful conduct against the Bank of England and the Bank had to defend itself in the way it 
regulated and supervised the banking industry.20 
 
The genesis of the Financial Services Authority (now Financial Conduct Authority) 
previously the single regulator for the financial services industry in the UK, derived from the 
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collapse of the BCCI. It was set up in 1997, taking over the Bank of England’s supervisory 
role for banks.21 It was established in order to bring together various distinct regulatory bodies 
in the light of certain regulatory failures that occurred in the 1990’s, such as the collapse of 
BCCI and Barings Bank. Its past supervisory approach was viewed as “light touch”22 and 
prior to the emergence of the 2008 economic crisis, it was based on three solid (and rather 
convincing) beliefs: that the markets are self correcting and that the discipline of the market is 
much more effective as a tool, than regulation or supervisory oversight; second, that the 
management of risk is the responsibility of senior management and boards of directors; this is 
because they are in a better position to assess business model risk than bank regulators; 
finally, that customer protection is best achieved by ensuring that wholesale markets are as 
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creative and transparent as possible.23  
 
This approach had many supporters. In contrast to the system of supervision adopted by the 
Bank of England, an informal regulatory approach based on confidence and trust, the FSA24 
was arguably better equipped to perform a supervisory function; its improved accountability 
mechanisms placed it in a stronger position to supervise and monitor large institutions. Still, 
the FSA was criticised for its ‘over’ focus on the supervision of individual institutions, a 
function undertaken quite sporadically and randomly. Its focus on wider sectoral and system-
wide risks was insufficient and as a consequence the “[...] vital activity of macro-prudential 
analysis, and the definition and use of macro-prudential tools fell between two stools”.25 The 
FSA ideological approach meant that the supervision of individual firms would be given 
priority at the great expense of the whole system’s regulation and supervision.26 Moreover, 
rather than focusing on the issues presented by various complex business models and 
strategies, the FSA concentrated too much in ensuring that processes were precisely defined. 
These issues combined, supported by the then governing philosophy of utter confidence in 
self-correcting markets, meant that even where the FSA did meet high standards in the 
execution of its regulatory and supervisory approach, “[...] it was not with hindsight 
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aggressive enough in demanding adjustments to business models.”27 This is so, even when an 
institution’s models were excessively risky.28  
 
Although corporate failures are not a new phenomenon, regulators and supervisors appear to 
have learnt few lessons from previous experiences with regards to the safeguarding of the 
long-term prosperity of firms that are under their management and supervision. Nonetheless, 
the inadequacies of the regulatory system became too apparent to ignore with the occurrence 
of the first bank run in over 100 years, that of Northern Rock.29 While its events might appear 
extreme, the case constitutes a common example of the continuous and various challenges 
faced by the banking regulators. The subsequent report examining the bank’s failure is 
therefore unique in its type. It is also of great importance to the consideration of failures 
within large institutions more generally: it identifies the key regulatory challenges for the first 
time ever since the events of 2008, and its evaluation can be applied more widely to a variety 
of institutions including those that have nearly failed, such as Royal Bank of Scotland, 
Bradford and Bingley, Lloyds.30 In more detail, the Parliamentary Enquiry into the Northern 
Rock crisis was unsparing in its censure of the FSA and the Bank of England, reserving its 
firmest criticism towards the FSA in particular. The enquiry found that while the crisis of 
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Northern Rock was indeed a failure of its own board, it was also a failure of the regulators and 
the regulatory system more widely. The FSA did not assign sufficient resources or time to 
monitor a bank whose business model was so clearly an outlier, and the procedures it 
followed were simply insufficient to supervise a bank with such a rapid business growth. This 
malfunction contributed significantly to the subsequent catastrophic difficulties faced by the 
bank. The FSA should have been continuously concerned with the bank’s liquidity, as the 
liquidity of such a ‘high-impact’ financial institution had the potential to adversely affect the 
wider financial sector; therefore, the FSA should not have allowed Northern Rock to weaken 
its balance sheet. It neglected its utmost duties, such as that of ensuring that the work of the 
board of Northern Rock was capable of performing its tasks, and in addition, it should not 
have allowed two individuals to be appointed to the position of chairman and chief executive 
because they both lacked any relevant financial qualifications.31 By and large, the prevailing 
view of the enquiry was that the FSA fell short of high professional standards in the execution 
of its supervisory approach, and that it showed serious failures in the performance of its 
management discipline duties and procedures. 32  Its procedures as the main supervisory 
authority were inadequate to supervise large institutions, such as those banks whose business 
grew so rapidly. There was lack of proper direction and a general failure to allocate sufficient 
resources or time to monitoring institutions whose business models were clearly problematic.  
These failures played a major role in the financial catastrophe of 2008, and linked with the 
fact that its resources were insufficient, it systematically failed in its duty as a regulator to 
ensure institutions do not pose a systemic risk to the country’s economy.33 
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Indeed, the near-collapse of Northern Rock and other institutions such as Royal Bank of 
Scotland, Lloyds and Bradford and Bingley raised serious questions about the levels of 
banking supervision, especially the ability of the FSA and the Bank of England to adequately 
meet their principal duty of bank monitoring. In fact these weaknesses were acknowledged by 
the FSA itself: the regulator did accept that there were obvious warning signals about the risks 
associated with Northern Rock’s business model, both with regards to its speedy growth and 
also in relation to the rapid drop in its share price. And yet, despite the signs, it did nothing to 
prevent the problems that came to the fore.34 It is also crucial to note the conclusions reached 
by another post-crisis report conducted by Lord Turner; the report noted the ‘pervasive 
influence of assumptions’ about the City of London on the political dynamic of the UK. As a 
result of this widespread influence there was clear pressure on the FSA to go easy on the City 
of London. Interestingly, the FSA never used the phrase “light-touch”; rather, politicians did 
so in speeches directed at the FSA. Additionally, there was an expectation that the regulator 
would be an advocate for the City; the FSA was not expected to do anything that would harm 
the corporate sector. In the end its dual role as ‘part regulator’ – ‘part sponsor spokesman for 
the industry’ was risky and confusing, resulting in catastrophic outcomes for the whole of the 
UK economy.35  
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C. Improving the Effectiveness of the Regulatory Authority 
 
Supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities are key in promoting and safeguarding 
sound corporate governance practices. As the OECD explains, such authorities must possess 
the ability, integrity and resources to fulfil their duties in a professional and objective 
manner. 36  It is therefore disappointing that serious omissions within the UK’s banking 
supervision were identified since the emergence of the banking and financial crisis. The 
actions of bankers may have triggered the catastrophe but this is also misadventure on behalf 
of the supervisory system supposedly designed to protect the public from systemic risk. The 
FSA, an institution that should have comprised of experienced professionals, should not have 
failed so dramatically in its duties. No amount of supervision can absolutely protect the public 
against systematic risk but a failure of this magnitude can never be justified. What has 
become clear is that, as the relevant market becomes more competitive, the case for prudential 
regulatory supervision of financial institutions becomes more urgent too.37  
 
Nonetheless, there are some ways to improve the effectiveness of the regulatory authority. To 
start with, the recent changes to the regulatory regime appear rather promising. The Financial 
Services Act of 2012 introduced a new, improved structure for regulating financial services in 
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the UK: not long after the emergence of the 2008 crisis, the responsibilities of the former FSA 
have been transferred two new bodies, the ‘Prudential Regulation Authority’ (PRA)38 and the 
‘Financial Conduct Authority’ (FCA), with the FCA regulating banks, building societies, 
insurers, independent financial advisers, mutual societies and investment managers and 
stockbrokers. The FCA is responsible for ensuring that conduct and markets regulation is 
firmer and more involved with consumers, and its main strategic objective is the protection 
and enhancement of confidence in the UK financial system. Additionally, it is given 
significant powers under the Financial Services Market Act 2000, an interesting development, 
particularly in light of the fact thatat these powers have never been properly utilised. The 
principles of the FSMA 2000 reinforce the FCA’s regulatory objectives and impose heavy 
obligations that must be observed by a regulated firm.39 The Act grants the FCA extensive 
powers to undertake authorization and supervision of the banking sector with significant 
enforcement sanctions and powers. It has a direct impact on corporate governance standards 
within the banking and financial services sector in that it imposes high standards of conduct 
and integrity on senior managers and key persons, including controller shareholders. If an 
institution fails to comply with the FSMA principles, the FSMA allows the FCA to take direct 
action, such as withdrawing a firm’s authorization, disciplining authorised firms and people 
(approved by the FCA to work in those firms), and imposing penalties for market abuse. 
Significantly, the FMSA rules require bank directors to comply with the ‘fit and proper’ 
person requirements both at the outset and on a permanent basis.40 The intention is to promote 
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management responsibility and to ensure there is competency and ability in all key roles. In 
assessing applicants, the FCA focuses on the “fit and proper” person criteria of honesty, 
integrity, reputation, competence, capability and financial soundness. It can look at people’s 
financial industry experience as well as their relevant qualifications. As noted, although the 
“fit and proper person” test has been used to judge the context of fraud and bankruptcy, in 
light of the excessive risk taking witnessed in recent years, there would be strong grounds for 
extending the criteria to professional skills and risk management.41 
 
Still, the regulatory enforcement measures have not been properly deployed ever since the 
crisis occurred. Certainly, the proper use of the FMSA rules is a pressing matter. For example, 
since the emergence of the financial crisis not many have been banned from financial services 
despite the extensive powers granted by the Financial Services and Markets Act. The FCA 
should use its powers more effectively and must not permit people to be appointed to high-
impact financial institutions if they lack the relevant qualifications, including training. As 
Turner puts it, the regulator relies on the presumption that management and boards of 
directors are better placed to assess the appropriateness of specific individuals for specific 
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roles.42 But this is not a logical assumption. Undoubtedly the absence of proper qualifications 
must be a cause of concern. For instance, the former CEO of Royal Bank of Scotland, Fred 
Goodwin, who presided over a breakneck acquisition spree that ultimately led to the collapse 
of RBS in 2008, had no formal qualifications. Similarly, the chief executive of Northern Rock 
was not a qualified banker and the FSA (the former ‘FCA’) was highly criticised for allowing 
this appointment. A good regulatory body should periodically carry out a review of the 
qualifications of senior directors in financial institutions, particularly of those institutions 
deemed to be “high-impact” and must ensure that the existing approved person regime 
requirements are adequate.43 As suggested during the Treasury Committee Enquiry into the 
collapse of Northern Rock, the regulatory authority must exercise its power to approve the 
appointment of bank directors and must ensure that these individuals have the required skills, 
knowledge and training to understand the business of their bank, its risk models and its 
financial implications. This will benefit not only the bank’s shareholders but also the firm as a 
whole, as well as the broader economy. 
 
The quality of board members is a particular concern of bank supervisors; after all, they are 
the ones who set the fit and proper person tests. However, such tests do not fully address the 
matter of competence, particularly board members’ ability to oversee large businesses with 
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potentially gigantic consequences on shareholders and other stakeholders.44  Although the 
FSMA 2000 grants the FCA the power to impose a financial penalty where it establishes that 
there has been a contravention by an authorised person of any requirement imposed by the 
Act, 45  there is an obvious weakness here: the provisions do not encompass the type of 
behaviour witnessed in institutions such as Royal Bank of Scotland, Northern Rock, Lloyds 
and many others; in other words conduct which shows a lack of skill and diligence. The FCA 
can, at present, assess the type of conduct that results in market abuse, in authorised persons 
acting without permission, in the contravention of the general prohibition to be an authorised 
person and in misleading statements and practices. Nevertheless, negligent conduct and 
general unfitness in the management of firms (such as of the type that resulted in the near 
collapse of several banking institutions in the 2008 economic catastrophe) can have 
catastrophic consequences within the UK context and more widely, and therefore cannot be 
pushed aside as irrelevant. Such conduct must be included within the powers of the FCA to 
impose financial penalties. The issue of directors’ competence must be fully addressed in the 
exercise of these powers and more thorough tests must be developed to help this goal 
materialise. 
 
Two further issues need to be raised. The first matter concerns the question of scale. The 
current staff resources within the FCA are simply inadequate. This is an institution that 
employs about 4,000 employees. In contrast with the bank HSBC that employs 330,000 staff 
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worldwide this is a modest amount.46 Indeed, two critical deficiencies were confirmed during 
the 2008 crisis: that there were inadequate staff resources and inadequate staff training. These 
shortfalls resulted in the ineffectiveness of the risk-based system of supervision.47 All in all, 
there was under-resourcing, and shortage of expertise in many fundamental areas, notably 
prudential banking experience and financial data analysis. Interestingly the FSA itself in its 
review of the supervision at Northern Rock, agreed with this conclusion;48 in fact, that there 
were only three members of the FSA’s staff assigned to the direct supervision of Northern 
Rock was described as unacceptable by the chief executive Officer of the FSA.49 Under-
resourcing is a major problem and deficiencies in terms of adequate supervisory staff 
resources must be addressed sooner rather than later. The consequences of such deficiencies 
are not trivial, particularly in view of the demands placed on supervisors. Further, in light of 
the difficulties in attracting competent and accomplished staff, regulators’ salaries could 
increase to help entice individuals capable of carrying out the more interventionist regulatory 
approach advocated here.  
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A further issue relates to the capital requirements which banks are required to hold to protect 
themselves against financial troubles. Lax rules in relation to capital requirements place a 
heavy burden on supervisors. Turner, in his report on the 2008 crisis, explained this well; he 
suggested that if there were higher capital and liquidity requirements, the need for ‘tight’ 
supervision would be seriously diminished. This is because when the capital and liquidity 
requirements are set “too close to the point of danger”, supervision is, by necessity, intensified 
to ensure that banks have not gone beyond the prescribed rules. 50  In this regard, more 
aggressive rules would help diminish this difficulty and therefore, the international drive for 
higher capital requirements is a welcome step forward.51  
 
III. THE INTERNAL ORGANS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
Two aspects of corporate governance have been linked with the emergence of the financial 
crisis approximately a decade ago. One is the widespread failure on the part of the boards of 
directors to understand and control the risks assumed on behalf of their companies.52 The 
other is the role of the shareholders as guardians of corporate governance. This part considers 
the question of directors’ qualification as an ex-ante measure and the question of their 
disqualification for unfitness as an ex-post measure to good corporate governance. This is 
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followed by a discussion of the role and significance of shareholder engagement in the 
governance of companies, a matter that has re-emerged into the scene following the renewed 
interest in their participation as owners as a result of of the UK Stewardship Code introduced 
in 2010. 
  
A. Directors’ Quality and Accountability 
 
Corporate governance concentrates primarily on boardroom behaviour. It requires 
management to consist of fit and proper persons in the sense of strong business ethics and 
high levels of competence in the performance of managerial functions. Still, it is not 
uncommon to find bank executives not even possessing the minimum degree of skill needed 
to do the job right. But why is this so? And more importantly, why is this a common 
characteristic of the numerous bank crises throughout history? For instance, the risky and 
flawed business models chosen by many executives significantly contributed to the 2008 
economic disaster, resulting in the UK’s eighth largest bank, Northern Rock to be nationalised 
and its largest mortgage lender, Halifax, Bank of Scotland (HBOS) to be rescued by a rival. 
On top of this, the UK also became the majority owner of two of the country’s top four banks, 
the Lloyds Banking Group and Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS). According to a consultation 
green paper on corporate governance, several deficiencies contributed to the failure of boards 
to exercise effective control over senior management.53 The deficiencies identified provoked 
serious questions about the quality of the board of directors, its composition, training and 
qualifications. The report found that boards of directors were incapable of seeing that the risk 
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management frameworks were actually appropriate for their institutions; they were not in a 
position to recognise the systemic nature of certain risks and were therefore unable to provide 
sufficient information upstream to their supervisory authorities. In fact, banks such as Royal 
Bank of Scotland and Lehman Brothers have suffered gigantic losses partly due to their 
executive’s inability to appreciate the lethal nature of risks they were taking with regards to 
the sub-prime mortgage market. 54  Significantly, there was insufficient training for those 
employees responsible for distributing risk products.55 
 
This lack of understanding of strategies and products, such as collateralised debt obligations, 
is particularly worrying, especially when considering the supervisory role attached to the 
board of directors. If board members do not possess the knowledge or skills to challenge other 
key internal company participants (such as the chief executive officer) then critical questions 
are raised regarding the quality of their qualifications and credentials. On this note, the 
shortcomings identified by the numerous post-crisis reports appear to point to the absence of 
healthy sets of skills and qualifications. Any deficiencies in this regard will eventually disturb 
the way board members manage, supervise and organise their firms’ internal affairs. But what 
can be done to tackle this issue? Increasing the duties and responsibilities of directors is not 
the logical conclusion; directors already have significant duties to comply with. Rather, the 
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identified shortcomings require concrete, long-lasting and durable solutions that can actually 
help improve the practices of large financial institutions in the long-term. Thus, this part will 
discuss two interconnected issues linked to this particular inadequacy: the question of 
qualifications and training is considered as an ex-ante measure to good corporate governance 
standards, followed by an examination of directors’ disqualification as an ex-post measure 
should they nevertheless fail to display the required degree of knowledge and skill expected 
of them. 
 
1. Directors’ qualifications and training as an ‘ex-ante’ tool 
 
In order to secure a healthy risk management culture at all levels, it is essential that directors 
of financial institutions are themselves exemplary.56  It is, in fact, the quality of a firm’s 
management rather than its business models that explains the difference in performance 
between banks. 57  With this crucial point in mind, it is essential that directors of large 
companies be required to have a minimum level of training and qualifications, akin to that 
required of other professionals. At present, anyone can become a company director; there is 
no requirement for any prior training or prior qualifications. The UK Companies Act 2006 
does not expect ‘future’ executives to possess any qualifications before securing a job with a 
large firm, although upon assuming the post pressure is placed on them in two ways. To begin 
with, the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 can disqualify anyone who does not 
appear to do the job right. The next pressure stems from the FCA itself: in considering the 
question of competence and capability the FCA considers a number of factors, such as 
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whether a person fulfils the relevant FCA training and competence requirements in relation to 
the controlled function performed or intended to be performed, whether the person has shown 
by experience and training that they are suitable, or will be suitable if approved, to perform 
the controlled function, and whether the person has sufficient time to perform the controlled 
function and satisfy the responsibilities associated with that function.58  
 
It can be difficult for outsiders to assess board competence; even so, it is frequently asserted 
that those managing large institutions blatantly lack any banking and financial experience, 
expertise and business qualifications. 59  Perhaps the absence of a requirement for 
qualifications or training makes some sense in relation to those leading small companies; 
there is inevitably a minimum cost to training that directors of closely-held companies may 
not be able to meet well, or meet at all for that matter.60 However, this is less so in relation to 
directors of large financial institutions. The larger the institution, the greater should the 
demand be for the appropriate set of skills and qualifications, particularly in relation to the 
specific functions performed. Worryingly, a post-crisis study estimates that at eight US major 
financial institutions, two thirds of directors had no banking experience.61 In addition, the 
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study found that those without a financial background are often members of highly technical 
board committees, for instance risk and audit committees. For example, at the collapsed 
Lehman Brothers four of the ten board members were over 75 years of age and only one had 
some knowledge of the financial sector the firm was operating in. This led the OECD report 
to state (in no uncertain terms) that boards must not be viewed as retirement homes “for the 
great and the good”. Still, history also tells us that having experience in banking is not 
everything; for instance, there were two board members on the board of Northern Rock who 
had extensive banking experience under their belt.62 Also, at the failed Bear Stearns seven out 
of thirteen directors had solid banking backgrounds and a good degree of financial 
experience.63 
  
What the above highlight is the need for training, particularly of those managing the large 
financial institutions. Interestingly this is also emphasised in the draft guidance issued by the 
Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA). The Chairman of the ICSA 
Steering Committee recognised the importance of offering board members and chairmen a lot 
more guidance on how to do their job properly, and its renewed guidelines talk of the huge 
role training can play in improving directors’ skills and knowledge of strategies, products and 
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risk.64 Similarly, Alexander (who gave evidence during the Treasury Committee Enquiry) 
highlighted the importance of training bank management to manage the technical aspects of 
stress-testing, stating that this is as important as the importance of the FSA (currently the 
FCA) properly exercising its power to approve the appointment of bank directors.65  
 
Many institutions were subject to severe criticism in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, for 
lacking the strong corporate governance procedures that would have ensured incentivised 
management to appreciate the risks they were pursuing on their institutions’ behalf.66 Even 
though responsible institutions are able to take their own steps to ensure that their controllers 
somehow understand complex business activities, there is a lot more that can be done. One 
step would be a legal requirement for the annual training of directors of large financial 
institutions. The purpose of this would be to ensure that those managing such institutions have 
the required skills, knowledge and training to comprehend the complex nature of their 
organisation, as well as the complicated financial implications of their individual decisions. 
Additionally, the FCA should ensure that the existing approved person regime requirements 
are fitting and appropriate; for instance, it should undertake an annual review of the actual 
qualifications of senior directors in financial firms, specifically of those directors leading the 
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“high impact” firms. The combination of soft law, legal rules and the FCA rules can ensure 
that the training requirements are effective, and remain effective for that matter. This will 
certainly be a positive step forward in assuring the public that boards are able to comprehend 
and manage the risks pursued by their firms. Crucially also, although training can be a 
significant expense to a large company, the social benefits and benefits to the broader 
economy should far outweigh the cost of training itself.67 
  
2. Directors’ disqualification as an ‘ex-post’ tool 
 
The proposition that directors must possess a minimum level of training and qualifications 
akin to those required of other professionals is noteworthy. Nevertheless, should directors fail 
to display the required degree of understanding and skill, the question of their disqualification 
as an ex-post measure becomes even more significant. This is so, as major weaknesses in UK 
bank corporate governance exposed a key flaw in the past few years; too many directors 
simply failed to appreciate the risks they were undertaking on their firms’ behalf; there is 
general agreement that mismanagement, incompetence and reckless risk-taking helped to 
pushed many of the UK banks to the brink of collapse. In many ways, this comes to as no 
surprise: historically failures akin to those of the 2008 crisis’ magnitude frequently occur 
because the nature of the transactions or the level of risk is not properly comprehended by 
those in high-level positions. On a positive note, past bank failures must provide an 
opportunity for wider policy learning and improvement. And certainly within the current 
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corporate governance environment, accountability is one critical issue.68  
 
Three decades ago the Cork Committee Report viewed the revival of disqualification for 
unfitness as an efficient way to protect the public from the negligent actions and abuse of 
limited liability by company directors.69 A disqualification order is an order made against a 
person under the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA);70 such a person 
shall not be a director of a company or in any way be directly or indirectly concerned with the 
promotion, formation or management of a company. 71  Although the CDDA includes an 
extensive range of grounds, in practice the majority of the disqualification orders are made 
under section 6. The section imposes a duty on the court to disqualify unfit directors of 
insolvent companies; it is the most litigated provision in the statute and provides for the 
mandatory disqualification of directors whose company has become insolvent, for the 
minimum period of two years and the maximum period of fifteen. Companies however, do 
not have to become insolvent for disqualification to occur: under section 8 the court can 
disqualify a person if satisfied that their conduct makes them unfit to be concerned in the 
management of a company.72 Additionally, it is possible to disqualify a director under section 
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121 of the Banking Act 2009: according to the section, the provisions of the Company 
Directors Disqualification Act 1986 can be applied to the bank insolvency procedure to ensure 
that an action can be taken against a director of a failed bank.73 Nevertheless, despite the 
enactment of the Banking Act 2009, there are real question marks over the effectiveness of 
the pre-existing laws to render bank directors accountable. Although there is general 
agreement that mismanagement, incompetence and reckless risk-taking significantly 
contributed to pushing many of the UK banks to the brink of collapse, there is a serious gap in 
the legislation: at present, a director whose company fails can be disqualified for 
incompetence and made personally liable for wrongful trading. At the same time, a banker 
who makes gross errors in the management of the bank can escape liability if the bank is 
eventually saved from collapse by the government. This normally happens because the 
government may fear that if the bank collapses or is allowed to go into administration, the 
consequences on the whole financial system would be catastrophic; to put simply, the bank 
might be viewed as being too big to fail. Still, this can result in some bankers comfortably 
slipping through the net; they avoid the possibility of disqualification because their ‘large’ 
institutions are saved at the last minute by the taxpayer.  
 
The statistics on disqualification generate both good and bad news. Although the number of 
disqualification orders against directors rose by 5% in the year 2012-13, 74  most 
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disqualifications continue to fall under section 6 of the CDDA 1986. This largely agrees with 
the general historical pattern: the Companies House statistical analysis shows that 
approximately nine years ago (2007-08) there have been 138 disqualifications under s. 6 and 
only 22 under s. 8. The pattern was similar in previous years: in 2008-09 there were 143 
disqualifications under s. 6 and 23 under s. 8 and in 2005-06, 90% of disqualifications were 
under CDDA 1986, s. 6.75 On a positive note, the statistics also point to the tough line adopted 
by the government on the question of unfitness: that directors who break the rules can face a 
ban.76 However, the failure to make accountable those responsible for near-collapses remains. 
It is certainly the case that banks are special institutions, and therefore any potential loss of 
access to banking services, even for a short period of time must be treated with sensitivity due 
to the resultant detrimental effect this can have on overall economic stability. Such 
institutions are too big to fail, or more accurately, too interrelated to fail. Banks have several 
counterparties in the financial system and may be integral to the global payments system, 
increasing the risk of contagion should they collapse. They have hundreds of thousands of 
depositors, meaning that a corporate distress on their side could lead to widespread personal 
hardship for many people. In fact, the integral part played by banks in the national economy is 
demonstrated by the nearly universal system adopted by states in regulating the banking 
world.77 And yet, if bank directors know that there exists an implicit guarantee, moral hazard 
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is likely to arise, increasing the need for regulation and supervision. 78  Exacerbating and 
heightening the possibility of moral hazard arguably gives bank directors the licence to view 
this as an insurance policy, resulting in an increase in the cost of a rescue if there is an 
eventual failure.  
 
Eight years on from the economic disaster of 2008 and the irony is clear: had banks been 
allowed to fail there would have been a number of successful disqualifications orders by now, 
especially on the grounds of unfitness. The evidence suggests that banks such as Northern 
Rock, Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds have suffered huge losses because directors failed 
to understand the nature of the derivatives that securitised “toxic debt” consisting of sub-
prime mortgages.79 Even when warned of the emerging difficult market conditions, boards 
failed to sufficiently safeguard their banks or to take steps to reinforce their position; not even 
as a precaution.80 They failed to see that a tightening in the credit markets would extend to 
good quality credit; rather, they opted for the more “reckless” approach to risk management.81 
Indeed, their behaviour fits the type of type behaviour described in the CDDA: case law 
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indicates that unfitness equates to the level shown in the recent crisis. This includes the failure 
to understand the complexities of one’s organisation and the failure to obtain at a minimum 
some financial knowledge to enable one to appreciate the company’s financial position.82 The 
courts are prepared to disqualify those who have been careless in attending to accounting 
matters and have engaged in conduct that generally demonstrates an element of 
recklessness. 83  Inactivity, lack of supervision, improper delegation, and so on, carry 
significant weight in the determination of unfitness and “incompetence”.84 Directors are under 
“[...] a continuing duty to acquire and maintain a sufficient knowledge and understanding of 
the company’s business to enable them properly to discharge their duties as directors”.85 
Conduct that falls below the standards of probity and competence appropriate for persons fit 
to be directors will result in disqualification.86 This does not mean that directors are expected 
to possess detailed knowledge of the company’s day-to-day conduct; a director’s role is 
strategic and organisational and therefore a good general knowledge of the business would 
normally suffice. 87  Re Westmid Packing sums up the position well; the judge held that 
directors owe duties to the company to inform themselves about its affairs and to join with its 
co-directors in supervising and controlling them. 88  Certainly, anyone who accepts the 
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statutory and fiduciary obligations of being a company director “should realise that these are 
inescapable personal responsibilities”.89  
 
Bailing out banks and ensuring that depositors’ savings are safe has been the aim of the UK 
Government; in the meantime however, the “[...] cherished concept of moral hazard has been 
left to wither away”.90 This is where we witness the reinstatement of moral hazard “[...] as a 
functioning market discipline in bringing about the reasonable financial discipline that we 
would all like to see”.91 As the report into the failure of Northern Rock recognises, banks and 
building societies view government’s support to Northern Rock as an indication of the fact 
that no UK bank will be allowed to fail.92 Although the existence of the FCA penalties makes 
disqualification a less significant path, we still need to deal with the problem of coherence in 
the law. The Government bailout is generally credited with having saved the UK economy, 
but by doing so it may have also saved irresponsible bankers from being held accountable for 
their actions. When the government stepped in to rescue institutions such as Royal Bank of 
Scotland and Lloyds through share purchases, Northern Rock through nationalisation, and 
Bradford and Bingley through loans, it won plaudits for prompt and decisive action that saved 
them from collapse. The price of this rescue however, may be more than financial. By 
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preventing the directors involved from being held accountable, we may not learn the lessons 
of the credit crunch, nor be able to prevent it from being repeated in future. The measures 
under the disqualification provisions have not been properly deployed, as shown by the fact 
that there have been no disqualifications for the near failures of institutions since the 
emergence of the crisis eight years ago. With both the banks and bankers escaping from the 
consequences of their reckless risk-taking, there is clearly an urgent need to review the field 
of disqualification. The idea that banks or companies should fail in order for disqualification 
to follow reinforces the issue of moral hazard. 93  This is a serious matter that must be 
addressed sooner rather than later.  
 
In light of the above, section 6 of the CDDA must be amended in such as way so as to reflect 
better the current realities of the financial world. Within its reach it must encompass failures 
as well as near-failures of firms.94 The same applies to section 121 of the Banking Act; it 
should allow actions against directors of banks that nearly failed. In addition, the powers of 
the Secretary of State under Section 8 should be used more extensively – the latest statistical 
figures show that the Insolvency Service rarely pursues cases under this section.95 These 
measures would help to diminish moral hazard, which most agree contributes significantly to 
the near-failures discussed here. Focusing on the cases that typically fall through the 
‘disqualification gap’ is a positive step forward in ensuring that the government’s framework 
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for maintaining financial stability “[...] does not provide free insurance to banks”96. In the 
absence of any such measures, the risk is that we will be less equipped to prevent the next 
catastrophe and make those responsible answerable for the chaos they may have caused. 
 
B. Shareholders and their Monitoring Role 
 
Over the past few decades debate has been wide regarding the question of directors’ 
accountability. But recently the attention has somewhat moved to the ownership black hole 
represented by the wider corporate participants; following the global financial catastrophe 
eight years ago, the institutional shareholders’ role has become a subject that elicits strong 
emotional reactions. The corporate governance framework relies on the assumption that 
shareholders engage with companies and hold management to account for its performance.97 
However, this assumption rarely represents reality; shareholders tend to adopt a passive role 
because they are predominantly interested in the short-term. There is a clear lack of 
shareholder interest in holding institutions to account, and this in turn encourages the 
excessive risk taking frequently experienced by the financial world across the globe.98  
 
The long-standing thesis is that shareholders can positively contribute to the governance of 
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public institutions.99 By virtue of the increasing dominance of institutional investors in the 
equity markets and possibly due to the failure to find alternative solutions to the “agency 
problem”, there has been a renewed interest in their significance. 100  Consequently, the 
introduction of the UK Stewardship Code in 2010 (revised in 2012)101 that applies generally 
to anyone investing in the corporate sector is of crucial importance. The Code makes it clear 
that the idea of stewardship is not restricted to company directors. Stewardship is as an 
investment ideology that ought to personify the investment responsibilities rather generally.102 
Institutional investors are expected to engage with management in collective terms especially 
during corporate or wider economic stress.103 Therefore it is important to consider whether 
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shareholders can ever be encouraged to act more like owners with an interest in the longer-
term performance of companies. Is a more systematic and continuous relationship between 
institutional shareholders and management about to evolve through the UK Stewardship 
Code? Should such a relationship even evolve at all? The Code, that has a lot of supporters, 
(some of who helped create it)104 is the first of its kind in the world. Initially introduced in 
order to empower institutional shareholders to act as owners rather than “investors”, it is the 
most comprehensive attempt to date to bring to fruition the belief that shareholders are part of 
the solution rather than simply part of the main problem. Potentially, it could turn the UK into 
a model for stewardship guidelines worldwide.105 
 
Shareholders are invited to challenge management far more than before. They are also invited 
to support the type of actions likely to result in a company’s long-term success. Instead of 
selling their shares at the first hurdle, they should communicate with the board and discuss the 
company’s strategy. Otherwise they should explain why they choose not to do so. More 
specifically, according to Principle 1 institutional investors are expected to publicly disclose 
their policy on how they will discharge their stewardship responsibilities. To ensure the 
monitoring is effective, they are required to hold a dialogue (where necessary) with the 
company’s board. Principle 2 tells investors to have a robust policy on managing conflicts of 
interest in relation to stewardship, and expects them to publicly disclose that policy. Its 
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guidance stresses the duty upon institutional investors to act in the interests of beneficiaries 
when considering matters such as engagement and voting. It also requires them to put a policy 
in place to deal with conflicts of interest. This is followed by Principle 3: institutional 
investors are required to regularly monitor their companies, and as part of this monitoring 
they should ensure that their company’s board and committee structures operate effectively 
and that independent directors do their jobs properly. Additionally, they should try to identify 
problems at an early stage to minimise any loss of shareholder value. If they have any 
concerns, they should raise these with the appropriate members of their board. Principle 4 
requires investors to have clear guidelines in place on when and how they will actively 
intervene; it also expects them to regularly assess the outcomes of their interventions. If they 
are concerned about the company’s strategy, performance or its governance, they must 
intervene. At first, any discussions should take place confidentially; should the board fail to 
respond, institutional investors should seek other ways of intervention, such as making a 
public statement in advance of the annual general meeting and submitting resolutions at 
shareholders’ meetings. Principle 5 tells investors to act collectively with other investors, 
especially at times of serious economic stress or when the problems faced by the company 
jeopardise its ability to continue. According to Principle 6 investors should have a clear policy 
on voting, and that voting policy should be disclosed. They are also told to use all their votes 
and to refrain from automatically supporting the board.106 Last but not least, under Principle 7 
institutional investors are to report periodically on their stewardship and voting activities to 
their clients, and must include qualitative and quantitative information within their reports.  
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Some dismiss the UK Stewardship Code as mere exhortation or box-ticking.107 There are 
doubts over key aspects of its application, with Lord Myners suggesting that there is “a degree 
of political correctness about signing up” to the Code.108 Its main weakness lies in its lack of 
pragmatism and inability to propose realistic solutions to the primary question it identifies: 
investors’ incentive problems. Its idea of changing the incentive structures for the better in 
order to improve the monitoring mechanisms is sincere; yet, investors face significant 
incentive and structural problems which, provided they reveal the underlying reality about 
shareholding in large institutions, will prevent the Code’s anticipated aims. That is why there 
are considerable reservations about the influence the Code is likely and able to have. For a 
start, in relation to the standards against which compliance will be assessed, the ‘comply or 
explain’ model of the Code allows institutional investors to assess the reasons behind a firm’s 
non-compliance. The comply or explain policy means that companies are free to explain 
rather than comply, a useful option should firms regard their existing arrangements as 
sufficient in promoting proper accountability and board effectiveness. And yet, despite the 
benefits of this policy, post-crisis studies indicate that the informative quality of explanations 
published by those companies that choose to depart from corporate governance codes, is not 
satisfactory. 109  The Code expects shareholders to adopt their own policies on their 
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stewardship responsibilities (Principle 1), conflicts of interest (Principle 2), intervention 
(Principle 4), collective action (Principle 5) and voting (Principle 6); yet, crucially this is 
contrary to the UK Corporate Governance Code, introduced in 2010, which imposes objective 
standards on issues such as the structure and composition of the board. In fact, in so doing, the 
Code sets a common basis against which ‘comply or explain’ operates.110  As noted, the 
credibility of a “comply or explain” obligation set against self-selected standards is 
consequently open to question.111 The restricted nature of the legal obligation for disclosing 
whether an institution has “complied or explained” potentially undermines the scope of the 
Code’s application; it also undermines its status as an industry-wide standard.112  
 
There are further complications to investors’ effective stewardship. Although there is nothing 
new about the matter of shareholder engagement, the question is now set during a different set 
of circumstances. These circumstances are possibly not as advantageous as previously.113 The 
decline in insurance companies and pension fund holdings as well as the increase in sovereign 
wealth and hedge funds is one important detail here. In addition, foreign investors are now 
much more important in terms of size, holding more than 40% of listed companies;114 yet, the 
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Code applies only to the domestic market. This points to its failure to recognise that times 
have changed and that the numbers of foreign investors have significantly increased. By and 
large, the shareholder base has been fragmenting; large parts of it have no rational reason to 
actively engage with company boards. 115  Expecting participation and engagement from 
foreign investors is really difficult, primarily because they are not subject to domestic political 
pressure to actually become involved. Also, as Hannigan says, as a result of stock lending 
practices it is difficult to isolate those shareholders with a real economic interest because of 
their distinct investment time scales and strategies. Therefore, it is unrealistic to expect 
increased participation and activism within such a diverse pool of investors, so reducing the 
scope for common action.116 
 
In addition, the model of engagement envisaged by the Stewardship Code is one in which 
long-term institutional investors engage with portfolio companies for the purpose of 
improving their long-term returns.117 However, institutions generally invest in order to receive 
a short-term financial return on their investment. Short-termism has been defined as 
“[...] foregoing economically worthwhile investments with longer-term benefits in order to 
                                                                                                                                                        
Crisis: Tinkering with Codes and the Need for Wider Corporate Governance Reforms: Part 2’ [2012] 33 
Company Lawyer 35. 
115 Such as the fast traders, the passive and exchange-traded funds and so forth. See T Jackson, “A Coded 
Response in Game of Heading off Brussels”, The Financial Times, 24 October 2010. 
116
 BM Hannigan, ‘Board Failures in the Financial Crisis: Tinkering with Codes and the Need for Wider 
Corporate Governance Reforms: Part 2’ [2012] 33 Company Lawyer 35, 37.  
117
 I MacNeil, ‘Activism and Collaboration among Shareholders in UK Listed Companies’ [2010] Capital 
Markets Law Journal 419, 424. 
44 
 
increase reported earnings for the current period”.118 The focus on the short-term has occurred 
primarily for two reasons. First, due to the increased weight placed on the full reporting of 
company performance on a quarterly basis; second, as a result of the shareholder pressure for 
gains.119 Interestingly, the OECD’s report has found that in some instances shareholders have 
been as concerned with short termism as managers and traders, neglecting the effect of 
excessive risk taking policies. 120  Conversely, investors’ dedication and focus on short-
termism does not sit well with the section 172 of the UK Companies Act 2006, which tells 
directors to be inclusive in their approach and to consider the company’s sustainable growth. 
One of the most significant and controversial provisions, section 172 attracted the majority of 
the debate through the various stages that eventually produced the Companies Act. It specifies 
that the director’s duty is to promote the company’s success for the benefit of the members as 
a whole. In defining “success” directors must make decisions that are for the long-term 
benefit of the members as a whole.121 Yet, it is not easy for investors themselves to measure 
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the performance of a company when a long-term approach is implemented.122 This can result 
in investors focusing on short-term indicators, such as quarterly reports and share prices, 
despite the fact that such indicators may not reflect adequately the underlying value of the 
company.123 Goodpaster summarises this well; he suggests that “[i]n business, there can be 
significant pressure for performance that potentially drives unproductive short-term behaviour. 
The goal of maximising shareholder value has become the justification for short-termism, and 
more specifically for fast personal enrichment. Institutions frequently get into financial 
difficulties by trying to grow without a well-understood mission and without clarity over 
purpose.” 124 Put simply, it is not in the genetic makeup of institutional investors to promote 
long-term goals of the firm in which they invest.  
 
A more practical limitation of the Stewardship Code concerns the issue of cost. In a typical 
dispersed investment environment (such as that of the UK) activism typically equates to cost. 
This is borne by the ‘active’ investor and is relative to the size of shareholding. At the same 
time however, the passive ‘free-riders’ enjoy the engagement efforts of the more energetic 
shareholders;125 this inharmonious scenario summarises the classic ‘free-rider’ problem that 
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typically occurs in corporate governance. In addition, since institutions routinely pursue the 
diversification of risk, they have fairly rigid limits on the size of any single holding in any one 
company; as Davies explains, this results in a limited benefit enjoyed by the institution that 
decides to act on its own to challenge any perceived managerial weaknesses.126 The benefits 
gained by the closer monitoring of managerial performance are therefore outweighed by the 
costs of such a policy.127  
 
The Stewardship Code introduces a quasi-regulatory framework but makes few substantive 
changes.128 Comparatively it lacks the objective focus of the UK Corporate Governance Code, 
which facilitates more practical and effective approaches to the typical corporate governance 
problems, such as the annual re-election of directors;129 indeed, challenging directors’ under-
performance can result in the formal external evaluation of boards with reports to 
shareholders.130 Further, the annual re-election of directors would make a stronger safeguard 
for investors because of their power to vote against re-appointment. Therefore, the best way 
would be to view the Stewardship Code as underpinning the UK Corporate Governance Code 
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rather than as a separate initiative in its own right.131 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Many of the intellectual beliefs held in the years leading up to the financial crisis – that 
markets are self-equilibrating, that directors’ risky ventures are valuable to firms, that 
directors’ training or shareholders’ involvement with management are needless corporate 
governance tools, have been greatly challenged in the past decade. Certainly, the question of 
how far poor practices led to the eventual catastrophe has been one of the most controversial 
since the global crisis’ emergence. In the aftermath, there are crucial questions about the way 
forward for the supervisory regime. There are vitally important issues about directors’ training 
and accountability. Shareholders’ level of engagement with their companies is also a matter 
that provokes a great deal of concern. 
 
Almost a decade on, there are significant lessons to be learnt. Crucially, in the years leading 
up to the crisis the levels of supervision and the ability of the regulatory authorities to 
adequately meet their monitoring role have deeply disappointed. The regulator is not the 
advocate for the City, nor part-regulator, part-sponsor for the industry. The authorities must 
become more courageous in the fulfilment of their regulatory and supervisory duties and must 
not shy away from using their enforcement sanctions and powers. Importantly, the regulator 
must cease relying on the assumption that management and boards are better placed to assess 
the appropriateness of specific individuals to undertake particular roles. Rather, the regulator 
must review the qualifications of senior directors periodically. It must also keep a close eye 
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on the conduct of large firms. Negligent conduct and general unfitness must be included in the 
matters assessed and considered by the FCA in the imposition of financial penalties. Still, for 
these changes to materialise more thorough tests should be developed to assess questions of 
competence. Nevertheless, a regulatory body needs sufficient resources and time to monitor 
large institutions; under-resourcing and shortage of expertise, notably in the areas of 
prudential banking experience and financial data analysis is unjustifiable. It is therefore 
important to tackle deficiencies in terms of adequate supervisory staff resources if they are to 
expect the regulators to do their job right. 
 
As far as the internal participants of corporate governance are concerned, there are crucial 
issues to consider. For a start, there is the matter of directors’ accountability and training. The 
shortcomings identified by the numerous post-crisis reports point to the absence of a healthy 
set of skills and qualifications. A legal requirement for the annual training of directors, 
particularly of large institutions would be a positive step. Although training can be a rather 
pricey corporate governance device, the social benefits and benefits to the broader economy 
should far outweigh the cost of training itself. In addition, the current disqualification regime 
does not appear to strike the right balance. With both the banks and the bankers escaping from 
the consequences of their reckless risk-taking, there is a pressing need to tighten the law here; 
only then can the system ensure that the right people are made accountable for their actions. 
Last but not least, empowering investors can, in theory at least, be a worthy goal; after all, the 
typical investor appears to have interests that coincide with the interests of the large firm. 
Nonetheless, in practical terms it is doubted whether shareholder stewardship should be 
encouraged. There appear to be several reasons for investors’ failure to do well in a 
stewardship role; perhaps that is why the UK Stewardship Code is yet to convince that it can 
make a noteworthy contribution to outcomes. Treating shareholders as the ideal management 
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monitors is simply the wrong approach; it is a romantic idea far removed from the reality that 
governance and shareholders in large companies exist separately. The promotion of a more 
systematic relationship between institutional investors and management is a costly use of 
company resources, and by preventing investors from evaluating most board decisions the 
separation between ownership and control has a valid efficiency justification. 
 
